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International Laws as Integrators and
Measurement in Human Rights
Debates
David A. Funk
[Much international law writing in the world] prescinds from
the hypothesis that international law is the "practice of
states"...... By what philosophical trick such an aggregation
of what is, after all, mere fact, is transformed into a system of
"oughtness" is unclear . .. .1
M OST CURRENT WRITERS on international law agree that
the present state of the international legal system is not totally
satisfactory.2 It lacks centrally organized sanctions, courts with com-
pulsory jurisdiction, and a body with adequate legislative powers for
making and changing laws. The
ultimate model of an interna-
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The attainment of this end by an international legal system presents
many difficulties. An obvious difficulty is the creation of interna-
tional laws which legally bind all States. Various techniques could
be tried and perhaps a combination of these will prove most effec-
tive. Nevertheless international laws themselves may serve as one
technique for helping to achieve this transition. If so, then inter-
national law may be said to be lifting itself by its own bootstraps.'
IO'Connell, The Role of International Law, 1966 DAEDALUS 627, 632.
2 See, e.g., Hoffman, International Law and the Control of Force, in THE RELE-
VANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21, 22 (K. Deutsch & S. Hoffman eds. 1968).
3 The analogy is not original. Deutsch, International Covenants on Human Rights
and Our Constitutional Policy, 54 A.B.A.J. 238, 242 (1968), applies "The Bootstrap
Doctrine" to a rule allowing any domestic issue to be made "the law of the land" by
being included in a treaty. G. MYRDAL, BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE 280 (1958),
has stated that the necessity of proper psychological attitudes such as cooperation for
international institutions and the necessity of such institutions for the development of
these attitudes is "something very much like trying to lift oneself by one's shoestrings."
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The purpose here is to consider how international laws may be said
to operate in this way and whether there is any evidence that they
actually do so.
In this effort both international jurisprudence and empirical re-
search are being utilized to add to international juridical science.
Current theories are viewed to show how international laws may,
directly or indirectly, 4 secure support for themselves and help to
integrate the international community. Recent research reports are
reviewed to determine the extent to which these theories have been
substantiated in empirical tests. Finally an attempt is made to de-
termine empirically the acceptance of international human rights
norms by United Nations delegates in the debates on the treatment
of Indians in the Union of South Africa. The methodological ob-
jective is to illustrate how studies of the impact of international laws
may test theories of international jurisprudence and thus advance
international juridical science. Both theory and research are brought
to bear on the substantive question: Whether international laws
may be used to strengthen the international legal system and advance
the creation of a more integrated international community?
I. DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The basic jurisprudential concepts above are those of H. L. A.
Hart,5 who distinguishes two different kinds of rules in a municipal
legal system. Primary rules are orders usually backed by sanctions
that oblige a subject to obey or endure the penalty.' Secondary
rules are those which indicate how primary rules are recognized,
changed, and adjudicated.7  Secondary rules are considered binding
if they are generally thought of, spoken of, and function as such.8
Primary rules made in accordance with secondary rules are legally
obligatory, even apart from sanctions." Thi is shown by general
pressure for conformity to the primary rules and claims for compen-
4 E.g., by constituting international institutions which in turn foster international
integration.
5 H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
6 ld. at 82.
7 Id. at 92-94. Secondary rules of recognition indicate what person or group may
promulgate laws recognized as such. Secondary rules of change indicate how new laws
may be introduced and old ones eliminated. Secondary rules of adjudication indicate
who may authoritatively determine whether a law has been broken.
8 Id. at 226.
9 Id. at 212. Legal obligation is sufficient, though moral obligation may provide one
motive for obedience to law. Id. at 225.
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sation and reprisals justified by them.'0 A legal system, for Hart,
requires a union of these primary and secondary rules." Interna-
tional laws currently differ from municipal laws in that they are only
a set of primary rules and not part of a legal system.' 2 Neverthe-
less, insofar as international primary rules are actually accepted as
standards of conduct and supported with appropriate forms of so-
cial pressure, they are legally obligatory and binding.' However,
international laws may currently be in a stage of transition from a
mere set of primary rules to a legal system with legally binding
secondary rules as well as primary ones.14
Professor Hart notwithstanding, the transitional character of the
current international legal system makes it advisable to consider
various degrees of international primary rules, international second-
ary rules, and the international legal system. Of course it is useful
to define these terms clearly for logical analysis, but the more impor-
tant consideration is the extent to which international primary rules,
international secondary rules, and the international legal system in
fact exist at a given time. Logically, it is pointless to ask whether
international laws may induce their own supporting sense of legal
obligation, because if a primary rule is an international law, it is
by definition legally binding. One could say that international pri-
mary rules induce a supporting sense of legal obligation and thereby
become international laws. But this construction eliminates from
the embryonic international legal system the rudimentary secondary
rules which make the primary rules, to some extent, international
laws from their inception. The concern here is with the transitional
state of the international legal system and the process by which in-
ternational laws become more legally binding. Therefore it is useful
to consider international primary rules as international laws and
legally binding to some extent since they are made, changed, and
adjudicated in accordance with what are generally accepted as being
international secondary rules. It is then appropriate to ask whether
these international laws, which are already somewhat legally bind-
ing, may help induce a greater sense of legal obligation so that they
become more completely international laws. If so, then the embry-
onic international legal system is maturing into a complete legal
system uniting primary and secondary rules.
10 Id. at 214-15.
11 Id. at 96.
12 Id. at 228.
1Id. at 229.
14Id. at 231.
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If international laws are matters of degree it is not surprising
to find controversy even over whether the term is appropriate. Some
claim there are no international primary rules or laws'5 except
where an international conference or assembly has been given express
authority to bind all by a majority vote.' 6 However, since the ex-
tensive compilation of Manley 0. Hudson,'7 others have taken a more
liberal view. 8 A careful reading of Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice does not foreclose the issue, as that
Article speaks throughout of "law" and its sources, not "laws" or
"legislation" specifically. An international convention, whether gen-
eral or particular, establishing rules not expressly recognized by one
of the contesting States, may still become a primary rule of inter-
national law by immediate international custom, that is, an immedi-
ate general practice accepted as law under a prior secondary rule
recognizing this as a source of law. It is not too early to consider
these rules as international laws or legislation, though the diffused
international system gives them special characteristics. Sanctions
may consist largely of denial of convention benefits and the pressure
of world opinion. Also it may be difficult to distinguish interna-
tional laws in treaty form from contractual treaties between interna-
tional subjects who are arranging their affairs under laws empower-
ing them to do so. Thus multipartite international treaties may be
regarded to some extent at least as international laws and the pri-
mary rules of the present international legal system.
The process or result of building a legal system with primary
and secondary rules is the legal aspect of political integration or
building a political community. This may occur on the national,
as well as the international level,' 9 and also implies the development
15 McNair, International Legislation, 19 IOWA L. REV. 177, 178 (1934):
[T] he term "international legislation" is a metaphor .... The essence of
"legislation" is that it binds all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the body
legislating, whether they assent to it or not, whether their duly appointed repre-
sentatives have assented to it or not. International legislation does not. It
only binds parties who have duly signed the law-making treaty and, where
necessary, as it usually is, have ratified it.
Cf. C. PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (1965),
stated that "the term 'international legislation' has come into common use. But it con-
notes no more than treaties having certain characteristics."
16 Potter, Treaties and International Legislation, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 1005, 1006
(1967).
17 1-9 M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION (1931-50).
18 See, e.g., K. HOLLOWAY, MODERN TRENDS IN TREATY LAW 580-81 (1967).
19 But see Jacob & Teune, The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the
Bases of Political Community, in THE INTEGRATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNITIES 9
(P. Jacob & J. Toscano eds. 1964), distinguishing integration of a national community
[Vol. 3: 123
19711 INTERNATIONAL LAWS AS INTEGRATORS
of a sense of "we-feeling,"" amalgamation of political units or func-
tions,2 and self-maintenance of a political system.22  Nevertheless,
the political integration process need not occur to the same degree
in all social groups. For example, international integration may be
more pronounced in heads of state, foreign service officers, officials
active in international organizations, or those with personal inter-
national experiences, rather than in the general public. 8 Strictly
speaking, integration applies only to people, so that it is inaccurate
to speak of integration of States except as an elliptical reference to
integration of certain groups or people within them.
Even if international laws are agents of international integra-
from international integration as "political integration among political communities"
where "[tihe problem is to integrate the already integrated." They regard these two
types of integration as not essentially different phenomena, however.
20 K. DEUTSCH ET AL, POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA
36 (1957), find that a sense of community rests on conditions of "mutual sympathy and
loyalties; of 'we-feeling,' trust, and mutual consideration; [and] of partial identification
in terms of self-images and interests." E. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE 5 (1958),
finds political community where "specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to
their central political institutions than to any other political authority" and "shift their
loyalties, expectations, and political activities to a new centre .... " Id. at 16. See also
Haas, International Integration: The European and the Universal Process, 15 INT'L ORG.
366 (1961). Jacob & Teune, supra note 19, at 4, look for strong cohesiveness within
a social group" and "a state of mind or disposition to be cohesive, to act together, to be
committed to mutual programs" in political integration. Id. at 10.
21 A. ETZIONI, POLITICAL UNIFICATION 329 (1965), requires three kinds of inte-
gration for political community: (1) control over the use of means of violence, and (2)
a center of decision making, which (3) "is. the dominant focus of political identification
for the large majority of politically aware citizens." P. HAY, FEDERALISM AND SUPRA-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1 (1966).
22 A. ETZIONI, supra note 21, at 330, defines integration as "the ability of a unit or
system to maintain itself in the face of internal and external challenges." With respect
to human behavior this has been termed "ultrastability." Lewis, Systems Theory and
Judicial Behavioralism, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 361, 381 n.100 (1970). If change
is to occur, there should be secondary rules for peaceful change. For K. DEUTSCH,
POLITICAL COMMUNITY AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 33 (1954), it is "the attain-
ment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions or prac-
tices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change." Haas, International
Integration: The European and the Universal Process, supra note 20, at 366, also em-
phasizes the "likelihood of internal peaceful change in a setting of contending groups
with mutually antagonistic claims."
The process of political integration should be distinguished from political socializa-
tion, which is confined to teaching a child to assume a political role in an existing so-
ciety. H. HYMAN, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION 25, 69 (1959); Easton & Hess, Youth
and the Political System, in CULTURE AND SOCIAL CHARACTER 236 (S. Lipset & L.
Lowenthal eds. 1961); Sigel, Assumptions About the Learning of Political Values, 361
ANNALS 1, 2, 7 (1965). But see V. VAN DYKE, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 18-19
(2d ed. 1966), where the author notes that "law reinforces peace through what may be
called a socializing effect."
23W. COPLIN, THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 182 (1966), stated
"[wihile international law can 'teach' the leaders of the state the nature of an evolving
consensus on the state system, it rarely penetrates the consciousness of the average citi-
zen."
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tion, they may not be the only or even very important ones. Per-
sons interested in understanding the whole field of international re-
lations may focus only on what they consider to be the most impor-
tant agents of integration, or prefer to study the most promising
ones first. They may lose interest if the integrative effect of a given
factor turns out to be illusory. However, those interested in inter-
national laws as phenomena should be interested in their possible
integrative role,'5 regardless of the outcome.
The above emphasis on rules helps to separate the concept of in-
ternational laws from the international legal process as such.2" It
is true that international laws function in a process, and the separa-
tion of laws from process is not an attempt to minimize the im-
portance of that process. However, even the supports for laws may
be considered as separate from the processes in which they operate.
Similarly, it helps to distinguish the concept of international laws
from the acts by which they are known. It is the requirement of
legal obligation that distinguishes international laws from mere pat-
24 Falk & Mendlovitz, Towards a Warless World: One Legal Formula to Achieve
Transition, 73 YALE L.J. 399, 404 (1964), noted that "it seems sensible to make claims
modest when discussing the autonomous role of law as a means to promote transition
and hasten the acceptance of a warless world" and that "the fundamental commitments
are social and political; without these the efforts of jurists are vain futilities." Id. at 404
n.21. Some would see international laws as inhibiting integration. Honigmann, Value
Conflict and Legislation, 7 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 34, 35 (1959), has stated
when value conflict becomes the subject of the legal process, one party to the
dispute becomes severely disadvantaged, quite without regard to the merits of
its position; second, a limited, sectional, social conflict is made more general,
involving more nearly the total community; and finally, the level of disequilib-
rium in social relations is heightened.
25 International laws may have other ultimate functions, such as preservation of
order. W. COPLIN, supra note 23, passim, suggests that order is preserved explicitly
and immediately by (1) the allocation of legal competences among states, that is defini-
tion of rights and duties, and (2) controlling or shaping deviant behavior so as to limit
violence. He claims that this is done implicitly and gradually by the development of in-
ternational social and economic welfare legislation and international political culture
or consensus through communications and teaching.
26 Myres S. McDougal, however, finds it useful to define international law as a pro-
cess of authoritative decision, not just rules. McDougal, The Impact of International
Law Upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective, 4 S.D.L. REV. 25, 36 (1959).
"The recommendation we make, from perspectives of human dignity and for efficiency
of inquiry into varying patterns of authority and control, is, accordingly, that interna-
tional law be regarded not as mere rules but as a whole process of authoritative decision
in the world arena ....." Id. McDougal & Reisman, The Changing Structure of Inter-
national Law: Unchanging Theory for Inquiry, 65 COLUM. L. REV., 810, 835 (1965),
have suggested that international law is "a comprehensive and continuing process of
authoritative decision in which the peoples of the world, in unorganized as well as
organized interactions, clarify and implement their common interests with respect to all
values ...." See also 2 THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER 1 (R. Falk & S. Mendlovitz
eds. 1966).
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terns of observed behavior.17  Observed patterns of behavior may
be some evidence of the existence of a legal obligation, since the
sense of legal obligation is an internal matter and hence not directly
observable.
International laws are most accurately distinguished from munici-
pal ones by their subject matter, though there may be a gradual
shading from one into the other and this fuzzy dividing line may
change from time to time. Traditionally, relations between States
adequately summarized the international subject matter,28 but this
situation no longer obtains. Rules relating to international organi-
zations and even individuals now must be taken into account as in-
ternational laws, though rules not directly affecting relations between
States must have some special relationship to interstate relations to
qualify as international laws.
II. RECENT THEORIES
The basic distinctions, definitions, and assumptions set out above
have guided the work that follows. In considering how primary
international laws may become more legally binding and thus
strengthen the international legal system and integrate the interna-
tional community, the available literature to 1969 was canvassed
for existing theories and research. Contemporary theorists gener-
ally have advanced three basic explanations of how international
laws may directly develop their own support.
The first, based on the natural law position, presumes common
insights and fundamental principles discoverable in nature. 9 The
assumption is that if international laws enunciate these principles,
they will be accepted as legally binding regardless of whether they
are authoritatively promulgated. Usually the test suggested is
whether a State would accept the rule as "fair" if it were in the po-
sition of its opponent.3 For example, new definitions and improved
procedures needed to strengthen international law should immedi-
27 Contra McDougal, Editorial Comment: The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the Inter-
national Law of the Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 356, 358 n.7 (1955), where the author
notes that "the reciprocal tolerances of the external decision-makers . . . create the ex-
pectations of pattern and uniformity in decision, of practice in accord with rule, com-
monly regarded as law." A. Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE ix (1959), also notes that
"the fundamental legal notions must be interpreted as conceptions of social reality, the
behavior of man in society, and as nothing else."
28 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1940).
29 O'Connell, supra note 1, at 632-33 passim.
30 See Falk, International Jurisdiction: Horizontal and Vertical Conceptions of Legal
Order, 32 TEMP. L.Q. 295 ,317 (1959).
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ately be accepted as fair and legally binding if they strike some
fundamental chord of human justice."' If these new international
laws can gain acceptance in this way, their enunciation should
supplement already existing international laws and further interna-
tional integration at least to that extent.
The second explanation maintains that the mere characterization
of an international primary rule as a "law" itself secures support for
it 2 from an association between international and municipal laws.
Support for municipal laws presumably carries over to laws in gen-
eral, so when the law label is attached to international laws, some
of this general support adheres to international laws. Furthermore,
municipal government officials cannot interfere with this spillover
effect38 since municipal government itself depends on respect for
laws and, without it, government officials cannot exercise power.
If they wish to retain power, they must advocate obedience to the
laws from which their authority is derived, and it is difficult to
maintain a distinction between municipal and international laws.
Therefore characterization of an international rule as a "law" makes
it risky for government officials to counsel disobedience and hence
they must generally support it. This spillover effect is enhanced by
"weaving" international rules into municipal ones; the more closely
the international rule simulates the municipal rule, the greater the
3 1 Wright, Maintaining Peaceful Coexistence, in PREVENTING WORLD WAR III
427-31 (Q. Wright, W. Evan & M. Deutsch eds. 1962). Definitions include "aggres-
sion," "defense," and "domestic jurisdiction." Procedures include strengthening the
International Law Commission and expanding the jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice.
32 Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal War, in INTERtNA-
TIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 191 (J. Rosenau ed. 1964), asserts that "It)he char-
acterization of a pattern of restraint as 'law' itself adds obligatory force, since respect
for law is itself a factor in the growth and effectiveness of a restraint."
33 Fisher, Bringing Law to Bear on Governments, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1130-40 passim
(1961). "A government is ... a structure which depends for its very existence on. re-
spect for rules." Thus "a high official cannot command the breaking of rules without
undermining respect for rules generally. And it is upon obedience to rules that his au-
thority to command depends." Id. at 1138-39. Fisher, Constructing Rules That Affect
Governments, in ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY (G.
Brennan ed. 1961), reprinted in PREVENTING WORLD WAR III, supra note 31, at 345,
notes that
[t~he entire power of a government depends upon the officers and employees
within it continuing to function in accordance with an elaborate scheme of rules.
The government's ability to break a rule depends upon whether that particular
rule can be sorted out and ignored, leaving respect for the other rules intact.
Fisher, Internal Enforcement of lnternatiopnal Rules, in DISARMAMENT 110 passim (S.
Melman ed. 1962), indicates that "there is a personal risk to any officer who suggests to
others that they jointly undertake a course of illegal conduct." Cf. L. HENKIN, How
NATIONS BEHAVE 182 (1968), states that "[haw observance is the daily habit of gov-
ernment officials. They live by the law even - or especially - without the intervention
of lawyers .... "
[Vol. 3:123
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transference of support. Thus, advocates of this approach to inte-
gration specifically advocate blending international and municipal
rules as much as possible.84  The purpose of blending these rules is
not merely the utilization of national power to enforce the interna-
tional rules, but also to help international rules achieve the same
status as municipal ones. Under this theory, international laws may
thus help to achieve international integration, but only if they are
made, changed, and adjudicated as much as possible within municipal
legal systems.
The third position goes one step further and considers interna-
tional laws as self-fulfilling prophecies" since the mere assertion of
a rule as an international law itself affects the social situation. Spe-
cifically, an international law becomes an element contributing to
the consciousness of policy-makers and the general public by empha-
sizing that an international legal system exists so that this in turn
provides a legal framework for the interaction of States. 6 The in-
ternational lawmaker is the "prophet," and the mechanism by which
he influences people is something more than mere statements about
international laws or mere propaganda in support of them. Outright
propaganda may also help integrate the international community and
build support for international laws, but it may be carried on by
anyone. The self-fulfilling prophecy argument attaches special im-
portance to the status of the international lawmaker as the speaker
and the fact that the message is spoken in the form of laws. When
34 Fisher, Internal Enforcement of International Rules, supra note 33, at 100, sug-
gests that "we might seek to weave international obligations into the domestic law of
each country so that by and large each government enforced the obligation against it-
self .... " "The rules should be mingled with the regular domestic law to the point
where they became indistinguishable." Id. at 113. Q. WRIGHT, THE ROLE OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW IN THE ELIMINATION OF WAR 84 (1961), observes that "a more ex-
tensive incorporation of international law in the national legal system, by constitutional
provisions or legislative enactment, is desirable." Cf. Schlesinger, Research on the Gen-
eral Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations: Outline of a New Project, 51
AM. J. INT'L L. 734-53 (1957), who seeks the rules common to most legal systems so
that the international system can be built primarily on these common rules, on the as-
sumption that it is easier to utilize rules already accepted in most States than to introduce
new ones.
35 The term derives from R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
ch. XI, 421-26 (rev. ed. 1957), first printed as The Self-Full/llling Prophecy, 8 AN-
TIOCH REV. 193-210 (1948). According to Merton, "[t)he self-fulfilling prophecy is,
in the beginning, a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes
the originally false conception come true." See D. EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
24-31 (1965); H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY 269 n.25 (1950).
For the application of this social mechanism in law generally, see J. STONE, SOCIAL DI-
MENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE 762 n.70a (1966); A. Ross, supra note 27, at 47
n.25.
86 W. COPLIN, supra note 23, at 192.
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the law is initially promulgated it is not widely accepted as an in-
ternational law, but this expression has a tendency to make it so in
time. This argument is based on the view that international laws
operate to some extent as symbols.37 For this purpose, a symbol is
anything that recalls and summarizes experience. 8 In the realm
of symbolic activity, action consists of the manipulation of words, 9
but this manipulation itself may cause a change in observable human
behavior.
The self-fulfilling prophecy mechanism may be particularly im-
portant in the civil and human rights movements. Initially second-
ary rules may not authorize lawmakers to create new rights. How-
ever, if they proceed without general support and enunciate laws
recognizing new rights, this characterization of rights as laws influ-
ences the subsequent perceptions of people who eventually do rec-
ognize the rights and consider the laws to be legally binding.4 ° This
subsequent recognition increases the support for common standards
of international human rights and further integrates the interna-
tional political community to the extent of this increased support.
Again international laws would have played a part in achieving an
international community.
The primary purpose of some international laws is to establish
or constitute international institutions. Indirectly, those laws may
also further international integration by mechanisms other than the
international legislation itself. Functionalists regard increased per-
sonal contacts of those working in the institutions as the chief inte-
37 Barkun, Legal Innovation and Behavioral Change, 53 IOWA L. REv. 352-57
passim (1967).
38Id. at 353 n.1. A symbol is "anything that brings up from memory something
felt, imagined, thought, or learned in the past, and consequently is a means of summariz-
ing experience." This definition includes both the "referential symbols" and "condensa-
tion symbols" of J. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964). It is broader
than that of C. FRIEDRICH, MAN AND HIs GOVERNMENT 99 (1963), who includes only
"signs for meanings transcending the empirical content," such as flags, coats of arms,
signatures, and the like.
39 Barkun, supra note 37, at 353.
40 Bloom, Steps To Define Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 18 CASE W. RES.
L REV. 1572, 1596 (1967), indicated that "the longer the international community
lives with even the verbal identity of such rights formulations, the easier it will become
to claim that disregard of them constitutes an international offense." Wise, Steps To-
ward the Advancement of Human Rights, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1548, 1566 (1967),
further suggests that "[i)t is no less important to have political values [human rights]
asserted in the form of obligatory rules. It gives them fixity and force. It may also so
educate men 'that the spirit of the laws can in time suffuse the laws of the spirit.' " Finally
Barkun, supra note 37, at 354-55, noted that "[alt the point of decision, human rights
norms exercise influence not because of sanctions that lie behind them, but simply be-
cause they are perceived to exist."
[Vol. 3: 123
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grating factor.4 Others see new international legal norms arising
out of the usages of international organizations.4" At first these are
mere customary patterns of behavior; but they then ripen into prec-
edents, and finally they are regarded as binding legal norms.43 The
whole international community eventually recognizes these norms as
laws and is to this extent integrated.4 4  Though international laws
are indirectly responsible for these integrative processes, the personal
contacts and institutional usages are the primary integrative factors.
A similar observation concerning municipal integration has been
put succinctly as follows: "States have made nations far more often
than nations have made states. ' 45  In other words, the establishment
of State institutions sets in operation processes which develop a sense
of nationality. Perhaps a similar approach may develop a sense of
international community.
There are those who would disagree with all of the foregoing
theories on the ground that international laws cannot aid in creation
of a world community. It has been claimed that law exacerbates
social conflict and cannot change social values 4" and that law cannot
build a relationship among States not already part of a system.47
Some would admit that international organizations may provide
means of more rapid communication,48 but they do not see much hope
41E. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE 48 (1964). "The most effective carriers
of integration, then, are expert managers of functionally specific bureaucracies at the na-
tional level, joined together to meet a common need."
4 2 R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 4 (1963), observed that "[ulsage and
precedent in political organs develop into legal rules - that is to say into norms which
are accepted as legally binding by the vast majority of the states and organs of the
United Nations." Later the author cites cases where the International Court of Justice
has interpreted the United Nations Charter in accordance with the "subsequent prac-
tice" of the parties. "Seventeen years' work by the United Nations has provided us
with an important new source of customary international law." Id. at 10.
43 Skubiszewski, Forms of Participation of International Organizations in the Law-
making Process, 18 INT'L ORGANIZATION 790, 795 passim (1964). "Patterns of con-
duct suggested by acts emanating from international bodies may slowly evolve into bind-
ing customary rules and practices ....
44 Parsons, Polarization of the World and International Order, in PREVENTING
WORLD WAR III, supra note 31, at 321-22.
45 Fox, Forward to A. ETZIONI, supra note 21, at vii. For a similar point of view
with respect to the European Economic Community, see W. FELD, THE COURT OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 121 (1964); Bebr, The Development of Community Law by
the Court of the European Coal and Steel Community, 42 MINN. L. REV. 845, 850-54
(1958); LaGrange, The Court of Justice as a Factor in European Integration, 15 AM. J.
COMP. L. 709, 724 (1967).
46 Honigmann, supra note 24, at 35.
47Aubert, Courts and Conflict Resolution, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 40-51
(1967).
48 Barkun, Bringing the Insights of Behavioral Science to International Rules, 18
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1639, 1651 (1967).
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for integration. 9 Still others make the point that international law
is not a very significant factor in building an international com-
munity.5 °
Theoretical analysis can isolate variables such as international
law and degrees of integration in the international legal community.
It can also formulate hypotheses as to whether and why there is
a positive or negative correlation between these variables, or no
correlation at all.51 Empirical testing helps to verify which of com-
peting hypotheses is most likely to be correct. Generally, those who
have used empirical methods to test the correlation of these vari-
ables have been looking for positive correlation, that is whether vari-
ation in international laws is positively associated with a more inte-
grated international community. Obviously laboratory testing is
impossible and it is difficult to isolate the relevant variables, so strict
research requirements must be overlooked. Nevertheless a start has
been made.
III. RECENT RESEARCH
Some rudimentary empirical work has been done recently to
test the first two basic theories as to how international laws may
build their own supports, namely that fundamentally fair rules are
immediately accepted and the spillover effect assures support of
municipal government officials. Two of these studies have some
bearing on whether fundamentally fair rules are immediately rec-
ognized as legally binding in an international setting. The first mea-
sured changes in the attitudes of United Nations delegates as a
result of actual contact with the rules and procedures of that body.
The goal was to measure United Nations work as a learning experi-
ence. Personal interviews were conducted at the United Nations
among 25 new representatives chosen at random. 2 After a year of
4 9 See, e.g., J .BRIERLY, THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAw 115-16 (1944),
who sees little hope for integration even through a world supreme court, since it would
be too unfamiliar with conditions in a particular State to form an opinion which would
win confidence.
50 Falk & Mendlovitz, supra note 24, at 404; Falk, Revolutionary Nations and the
Quality of International Legal Order, in THE REVOLUTION IN WORLD POLITICS 301-31
(M. Kaplan ed. 1962), reprinted in DYNAMICS OF WORLD POLITICS 126, 127 (L. Miller
ed. 1968), where it is observed that "[Ijaw is a relatively dependent variable, signifi-
cantly useful in a stable social system, dramatically marginal in an unstable social system.
By itself, legal technique cannot introduce stability."
51 This is the null hypothesis that any apparent correlation is only what would be
expected under laws of chance within the levels of accuracy previously selected. See,
e.g., J. MYERS, FUNDAMENTALS OF EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 27 (1966).
52 Alger, United Nations Participation as a Learning Experience, 27 PUB. OPINION
Q. 411-26 (1963).
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experience these representatives were interviewed again and there was
indeed a greater tendency to see the world as one political system.5"
Perhaps increased support for international laws could be deduced
from this, though there was no attempt to test the specific effect of
increased knowledge of international laws. On the other hand, rep-
resentatives also saw the United Nations more as an instrument for
gradual adjustment toward consensus and less as a device for pro-
ducing immediate solutions to problems.54  Therefore working with
the rules did not induce any great confidence in them as measures
of reform as compared with the effect of the institutional contacts.
Here the key factor was the "new linkages" that were formed be-
tween formerly isolated roles played in individual units and new
roles played in the context of the institution,55 which would tend to
support the functionalist argument. In the end this small study
failed to show any definite effect of international laws on the per-
ceptions of delegates, though it does illustrate the type of work which
could be done on this question and thus can be considered heuristic.
The second study was more specifically related to laws but dealt
with an even more specialized type of person. Its purpose was to
determine how judges on the International Court of Justice voted
when their own State was a party. 56 The Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice57 provides that a State is always entitled to
have a judge on the court in a case in which it is a party, so if one
of the permanent judges is not a citizen of that party, a special ad
hoc judge is appointed for that case. The permanent or special judge
was considered a "national" judge and the objective was to compare
the votes and viewpoints of the "national" judges with the others.
The other judges were considered neutral for that case so they served
as a control group.58 The analysis was limited to cases in the years
1945-60. Though the preliminary edition only covered "contentious"
proceedings, advisory opinions are also to be included in the final
edition when published. Unfortunately the sample used is quite
53 Id. at 422 n.16.
54 Id. at 425.
55 Id. at 426. However, the one delegate who had been a judge before coming
to the United Nations predicted little relationship between his judicial post and his new
position in the United Nations. Id. at 421.
56 p. LIACOURAS, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (Prelim. ed. 1962).
57 I.C.J. STAT. art. 31.
58 Of course the entire study assumes that points of view are confined strictly within
national boundaries. Perhaps an analysis based on major bloc viewpoints might yield
different results. Very few Communist Bloc judges were involved; however an analysis
along developed-underdeveloped or imperialist-colony lines could have been done and
might have been instructive.
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small, as there have only been 33 separate contentious matters and
11 advisory opinions, for a total of 44. Of the separate contentious
matters, four were pending at the end of 1960. Of the remainder,
13 were disposed of by order and 16 by judgment. Moreover, two
permanent judges (Hackworth of the United States and McNair of
the United Kingdom) were "national" judges in 11 and 10 matters
respectively, so that only 20 other judges were involved, and for the
most part, they participated in only one or two "national" matters.
Due to the small numbers involved the study is necessarily more
episodic than statistical.
Nevertheless, within these limitations some tentative conclusions
could be drawn.5" National judges as a whole voted "for" their
State on 77%6 of the issues and "against" their State on only 23%0
of the issues. They never voted "against" their State in a dissenting
opinion; every time they voted "against" their State it was also the
judgment of the court. On 11o of the issues, while the national
judge was voting "against" his State, some other judge or judges were
voting "for" his State. Permanent national judges were never the
only ones voting "for" their State and usually three or four others
joined in that vote. Ad hoc national judges, on the other hand,
were the only ones voting "for" their State in 8o of the issues in
which they were involved, and in another 8o of the issues in which
they were involved, only one other judge joined them in voting "for"
their State. Ad hoc national judges voted "for" their State, though
the court did not, on 41%o of the issues, but permanent judges did so
only on about half this percentage (22%o) of the issues. Thus na-
tional judges obviously do not always vote "for" their State, nor do
they always do so even when some other judge votes for that point
of view. But ad hoc national judges are more inclined to vote the
national point of view than permanent ones.
In order to relate this behavior pattern to international laws, it
must be assumed that the rules of international law (including in-
ternational laws) account for any deviations from consistent support
of the State. If this is true, then international laws apparently have
some independent appeal to the national judges. Other factors
being equal, presumably the greater influence of international laws
on the permanent judges is reflected in their greater deviation from
the national point of view. However, it must be remembered that
the ad hoc judges must return sooner to their constituents and were
named with a particular case in mind, which might also explain
59 P. LIACOURAS, supra note 56, at 526-27b, Tables 2 and 3.
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these differences. A legal realist could argue that the amount of de-
viation from the expected norm is so small as to prove the irrele-
vance of international laws altogether. In addition, there are many
differences between these law-oriented men and political leaders or
the public at large with respect to the formation of an integrated
political community. However, if there were no influence of inter-
national laws on this group of jurists, then it surely would be cause
for despair. At least the influence of legal rules seems to be gaining
some support in this quarter.
The second theory above asserts that the law label attached to
an international rule helps it gain acceptance, at least to the extent
that government officials cannot very well counsel violation. 60 A
start has been made toward seeing whether this "spillover effect"
is observable in actual decision-making activities. The specific pur-
pose of one study was to evaluate the weight given to the legal fac-
tor in making specific policy decisions."' Two case studies were un-
dertaken which dealt with decision-making by United States Govern-
ment officials. The decisions involved how to respond to the attack
on Korea and the threat to Formosa. In the former, the decision
was to rely on United Nations procedures, whereas in the latter, the
officials decided on unilateral action. The basic method was to re-
view all available records of communications among those involved
during the process of decision. The assumption was that if inter-
national laws were important in decision-making, they would be men-
tioned and, in fact, should have provided an important foundation
for at least one proposed course of action. Furthermore, this course
of action should have won adherents partly on the ground of sup-
port of international laws, and ultimately should have been adopted.
One conclusion involved the Korean decision where legal and polit-
ical factors pointed to the same general course of action. However,
"[t]he outlook of the policy-makers was also conditioned by their
conviction, that what was happening was 'aggression,' an interna-
tional wrong, and a clear-cut violation of the law of the [United
Nations] Charter. '6 2 On the other hand, it was concluded that "law
was not a factor in the Formosa decision."" There, law seemed to
be only a "mine of arguments applied as justification after the event"
60 See notes 32-34 supra & accompanying text.
61 Hoyt, The United States Reaction tq the Korean Attack: A Study of the Principles
of the United Nations Charter as a Factor in American Policy-Making, 55 AM. J. INT'L
L. 45 (1961).
62 Id. at 53.
63 Id. at 66.
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and "window-dressing rather than real reasons for the policy adopted
at that time." 64
One problem, of course, is the difficulty of obtaining full and
accurate information about the actual decision-making process.
Also, a very detailed study of a few situations can only provide a
reasonably reliable answer to a very limited question: Whether in-
ternational laws were an important factor in these particular deci-
sions? If enough careful work is done, however, then some broader
conclusions might be drawn. This study suggests seven other recent
United States decisions that could be similarly reviewed .6  Particu-
lar attention to the role of the legal advisers of the State Department
and the reaction of decision-makers to their advice would probably
also be fruitful.66 Eventually some conclusions could be drawn con-
cerning government officials' actual reactions to international laws
at the point of decision. The Formosa decision suggests they can
and sometimes do ignore the legal factor, while the Korean decision
suggests that they are influenced by it when it is consistent with the
national interest. Perhaps further research would show government
officials acceding to international laws in the actual process of deci-
sion-making, even when it is against the national interest. They
might even appear to do this out of respect for an obligation to
support international laws, rather than fear of sanctions in case of
violation. If so, then this would be some evidence of growing inter-
national integration, at least among these government decision-
makers.
Another study implies that international laws sometimes do and
sometimes do not have an integrating effect. The goal was to de-
termine how States actually behave with respect to international
laws."7 The author concluded that "[i]n our world, international
law is observed because of political reasons - the fear of political
64 Id.
65Id. at 74-75 n.106., These are as follows: the question of intervention in Indo-
china, the Guatemalan case, the treaty with Chiang Kai-shek, incidents concerning the
Chinese "off-shore" islands, intervention in Lebanon, the Suez crisis, and the Cuban
crisis.
66 The role of the legal adviser is just beginning to be studied and is still on the
level of mere description. See H. MERILLAT, LEGAL ADVISERS & FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(1964); H. MERILLAT, LEGAL ADVISERS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
(1966); Bilder, The Office of the Legal Advisor: The State Department Lawyer in For-
eign Affairs, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 633 (1962); Fitzmaurice, Legal Advisors and Foreign
Affairs, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 72 (1965); cf. 1-3 A. MCNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW
OPINIONS, SELECTED AND ANNOTATED (195 6).
67 L. HENKIN, supra note 33.
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sanctions, of responses and consequences. ' 8  Four specific case
studies were undertaken. 69 With respect to Nasser's nationalization
of the Suez Canal, the conclusion was that "the law works."7 ° Laws
influenced Nasser to undertake adequate compensation and guarantee
continued free passage in the Canal 71 and they helped persuade Bri-
tain at least to postpone the use of force to give diplomacy an oppor-
tunity.72 A different conclusion was reached concerning the 1956
outbreak at Suez and Sinai where law failed initially, but was later
vindicated. 73  Similarly law failed in the Adolf Eichmann case.74
Finally legal considerations influenced United States policy-makers
to some extent with respect to the Cuban missile quarantine75 in
that, at least for some policy-makers, international laws helped carry
the day for quarantine as a first step instead of bombing.70
The indirect integrative effect of international laws operating
through international institutions may be deduced from a few ex-
tant studies. One has analyzed the effects of personal contacts in
the International Labour Organization 77 and found integration re-
sulting more from the logic of hostile confrontation than jurispru-
dence.78
Another has reviewed the development of international laws
through the political organs of the United Nations.79 The basic
approach of this study was to examine certain broad rules developed
by the United Nations concerning: (1) statehood; (2) domestic
jurisdiction; (3) recognition, representation, and credentials; (4)
legal limits to the use of force; and, (5) the law of treaties. The
development in the United Nations of each concept is traced in de-
tail and the various statements of the rule, including the qualifica-
68 Id. at 225.
69 Notwithstanding, the case study method itself was said to distort conclusions be-
cause a case study must usually rely on printed evidence of the decision-making pro-
cess, although this is generally available only for the unusual, crucial decisions. The
principal effect of international laws is in shaping policy in the daily operations of govern-
ments, but these decisions are not reported in sufficient detail to enable accurate analysis.
Id. at 178-79.
70 Id. at 186-94.
71Id. at 189.
72 Id. at 194.
73 Id. at 195-205.
74 Id. at 206-15.
75Id. at 216-42.
76 Id. at 226-27.
77 E. HAAS, supra note 41, at 126 et seq.
78 Id. at 425.
79 R. HIGGINS, supra note 42.
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tions, refinements, and special circumstances, are set forth. The ac-
tual practice of the United Nations members with respect to each
rule is then observed. However, there was no effort to test the key
element - whether the laws were accepted as legally binding. It is
conceded that this is crucial,80 but the great difficulties of such an
undertaking are recognized." The author was able to show that
practice was consistent with reasonably simple rules. If the rules
had been accepted as legally binding, then practice in accord with
the rules would be expected; however, if the rules are not accepted as
legally binding, the obverse would not obtain. Practice consistent
with the rules does not necessarily show that the rules have been
accepted as binding. 2 Of course all "proof" depends on this same
post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy, but the conclusions advanced
would be more convincing if there were at least some attempt to
deal directly with the acceptance of the rules. Undoubtedly, this
work is valuable for what it attempts to do and should be useful
to those doing further research in the area. However, the limited
scope of the inquiry leaves doubt as to whether its conclusions are
adequately supported.83
Other studies hold out even less hope for international laws as
80 "Usage and precedent in political organs develop into legal rules - that is to say
into norms which are accepted as legally binding by the vast majority of the states and
organs of the United Nations." Id. at 4. "The only possible answer to the problem of
at what stage a usage becomes law must be at that point at which states regard themselves
as legally bound by the practice - a point which can only be ascertained by the close
examination of states' attitudes and public statements." Id. at 6.
sl Id. at 6.
82 For a review, highly complimentary in general, but criticizing Mrs. Higgins on
this point, see Schwebel, Book Review, 75 YALE L.J. 677-81 (1966).
83 For example, in general, 17 years of work by the United Nations are said to pro-
vide us with "an important new source of customary international law." R. HIGGINS,
supra note 42, at 10. On some of the issues practice does conform to a pattern that
may be expressed in rules. States have not been admitted to membership on a "politi-
cal" basis and members have adhered to legal criteria, though these must be variously
interpreted to explain their actions. Id. at 12-14, 54. In fixing the limits of domestic
jurisdiction, actions are said to conform to international laws, but this includes the prin-
ciple that international laws change and develop, not arbitrarily, but by good faith
interpretation. Id; at 130. On some other issues, however, the analysis does not seem
to show a consistent pattern of action. Interpretation of rules on recognition, representa-
tion, and credentials seems to be significantly influenced by policy considerations, Id.
at 133. These questions are approached pragmatically. Id. at 165. The rule that
force is to be used only for self defense is said to be too general to be useful. Id. at 167.
However, international laws in this area are apparently expected to develop in the future.
Id. at 239. Similarly, practice respecting treaty law apparently is developing new
rules, but the analysis does not demonstrate their acceptance. Id. at 236. It is conceded
that practice sometimes derives from fear of response if an opposite course is taken,
or from self-interest. Id. at 8. The study leaves for another day "the close examination
of states' attitudes and public statements." Id. at 6. This, rather than mere practice,
seems to be the crucial element.
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integrators than those already mentioned. For example, one con-
cludes that international laws do not integrate.84  Governments of-
ten formulate their mutual relations in terms of law, but it is a law
of excessive flexibility at the service of the subjectively defined inter-
ests of each State, so there is an intimate connection between the
statement of the rule and the specific interest of the moment. In
such a milieu, rules and system have little meaning.85 The author
proposes to measure in some degree the influence of legal notions
on foreign policy,86 respecting: (1) the mare clausum and the mare
liberum;87 (2) international arbitration of disputes;8 8 (3) attempts
to settle disputes through international organizations;89 and (4) the
human rights movement."0 Actually there is not much effort to state
precisely the standards of applicable international laws and care-
fully measure the conduct of States against them, but perhaps this
is not possible with the view of international law adopted. With
respect to arbitration, it is observed that "[tjhe body of material
known as international law is so vague and debatable that justifi-
cation can be found in it for any award a reasonable man would be
likely to make."'" If this view were correct, there would be no
point in measuring the behavior of States against such an amorphous
standard. The international juridical scientist should then posit
some determinants of behavior other than laws and compare the
actual behavior with those determinants. This would not prove
that laws are not a determinant, but at least it would support the
other possibilities as the significant ones. However, until more em-
pirical research is done such a pessimistic view seems unwarranted.
With so much writing in the field of international law, it is dis-
appointing to find so few attempts at empirical research, especially
on whether and how international laws may foster international in-
tegration. Particularly in the field of international law, legal schol-
ars cannot limit juridical science to the analytical exposition of exist-
ing principles, but should consider the effects, if any, of international
laws on the embryonic international system. This requires moving
84 p. CORBETT, LAW IN DIPLOMACY (1959).
85 Id. at 271-75.
86 Id. at vii.
87 Id. at 110-35.
881d. at 136-86.
89 Id. at 187-250.
90Id. at 251-70.
91 Id. at 137.
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beyond mere analyses of the laws, decisions, and authorities into
empirical methods, well adumbrated in the following:
[T]he new methods will be concerned with the psychological de-
termination of international legal constructs as they appear in the
minds of the relevant national decision-makers and their legal
counsel, and as they have been employed in international bargain-
ing and claim-conflict situations. The methods will involve inter-
view data, content analyses of memoirs, biographical data, and state
papers, and the use of multiple regression analysis to determine
the various "weights" to be assigned to various kinds and forms
of legal argumentation that have been relatively persuasive in cases
of international bargaining. . . This should serve to put the
"traditional" learning in its proper setting as part of the psycho-
logical mechanism that goes into influencing the behavior of others
by invoking the terminology of "law." 92
IV. MEASUREMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS
SOUTH AFRICAN INDIAN DEBATES
The foregoing amply illustrates that international juridical sci-
ence is still in its infancy and the main tasks lie ahead. Neverthe-
less, by focusing on one small facet of international integration via
international laws, perhaps a small contribution can be made to this
discipline. The results of measuring one index - the effect of in-
ternational laws creating human rights in one particular context -
will be reported here to see if in this respect such laws are inducing
a supporting obligation to obey them. Though much descriptive
material has been written on international human rights laws, a
careful study of their impact has yet to be undertaken. 3
92 D'Amato, Book Review, 11 J .CONFLICT RESOLUTIoN 504, 509 (1967).
9 Some attention has been given, however, to a similar problem concerning civil
rights in the United States. William K. Muir, Jr. happened to interview a limited sam-
ple of school board members, superintendents, and principals prior to the decision of
School District of Abingdon Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 208 (1963). After the
Schempp decision, he carried out follow-up interviews to determine the resulting change
in attitudes. This furnished a unique opportunity to measure the reaction of at least
one small group to the enunciation of new civil rights standards. Of course, the enunci-
ation was authoritative and in a national judicial setting, but it illustrates that, to some
extent, the mere enunciation of rights eventually brings them into existence. W. MUIR,
PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967).
David J. Danelski urges similar research in the human rights area in the following
terms:
Each of the component behaviors of human rights can be specified empirically
and survey research methods can be used for that purpose. World-wide inven-
tories of man's perceptions of man, of his acknowledgments of the kind of
treatment man is entitled to as man, and of rights in action would be a be-
ginning .... With such data, men's perceptions of other men could be ex-
plored more fully and profoundly than they have ever before, and hypotheses
concerning man's failure to perceive some of his fellow men as fully human
could be tested. The whole acknowledgment process could be explored in
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In all but one of the first 16 sessions of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly, the treatment of Indians in the Union of South
Africa was debated by the General Assembly or its committees. 4
A considerable number of Indian workers had gone to the Union of
South Africa in the late 1800's under arrangements between the two
governments. Governmental policies in South Africa imposed vari-
ous restrictions on these immigrants; therefore special treaties were
ratified between India and the Union of South Africa in 1927 and
1932 to guarantee certain minimum rights. After World War II, the
Union of South Africa increasingly applied policies of racial segrega-
tion (apartheid) discriminating against non-Caucasians in matters
concerning employment, residence, and many other aspects of life.
In 1950 the South African Parliament enacted the Group Areas Act
which was designed to further segregate the peoples of various races
in South Africa. Though these measures were directed primarily
against Negroes, they created hardships for Indians as well. India
claimed that they violated not only the terms under which the In-
dians had originally emigrated, and the treaties, but the United Na-
tions Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as
well. The Union of South Africa claimed that treatment of Indians
in South Africa was a matter of domestic jurisdiction and not an ap-
propriate subject for United Nations discussion. This dispute pro-
vides a relatively stable context in which delegate statements of
general acceptance or rejection of international human rights stand-
ards may be compared from one session to another.9"
The examination was limited to delegates' statements concerning
the application of such standards in their own States, on the assump-
tion that "admissions against interest" in an international forum are
more significant indications of true mental attitudes than gratuitous
advice on how other States should conduct their affairs. Rough
methods of content analysis were applied to these statements to mea-
sure any increasing or decreasing sense of obligation with respect to
human rights norms. The results show almost immediate accep-
tance of these norms after their enunciation as international laws,
terms of learning theory and other psychological theories, and finally hypothe-
ses could be tested concerning the conditions under which acknowledgments
become rights in action and conditions under which they do not. Danelski,
A Behavioral Conception of Human Rights, 3 L. TRANSITION Q. 63, 72
(1966).
04 This issue was not discussed all during session IV.
95 For a general review of the course of this dispute in the United Nations, see
EVERYMAN'S UNITED NATIONS 127-30 (7th ed. 1964).
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subject to a temporary decline in sessions VI through VIII. 6 The
pattern suggests that human rights norms derive their ultimate sup-
port from coincidence with fundamental notions of fairness rather
than through the gradual mechanism of self-fulfilling prophecy.
Some international jurists would say that human rights standards
have not yet been included in international legislation.17  Others
would say that, while the early formulations of these norms were
not international laws, later ones were.98 Finally, a third group
would say that human rights norms became international laws, how-
ever indefinite, when the United Nations Charter was signed. 9 The
argument could be made that the human rights provisions of the
United Nations Charter are too general to constitute international
laws, or that the Charter was only an "agreement to agree." But
the Charter provisions were part of an almost universal international
treaty which is the most accepted current form of international leg-
islation. Even if these Charter provisions were too vague to consti-
tute international laws on the ratification of the Charter, the adop-
tion of Resolution 44(1)100 and the Declaration of Human Rights
in 1948101 remedied this defect shortly thereafter. The aggregate
indicates an intent to supply some specific standards in an almost
universal treaty which should constitute international law to some
extent at least. The procedures about to be described were designed
to try to measure one index to the degree of acceptance of these in-
ternational laws. Even customary international law requires a sup-
porting sense of legal obligation. Mere acts in the form of practices
of States without proper attitudes are not sufficient.10 2 The problem
96 This may be explained by the interplay of international legal obligation and na-
tional self-interest.
97 See P. DROST, HUMAN RIGHTS AS LEGAL RIGHTS 29-36 (1951); H. KELSEN,
THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 2 7-42 (1951); Hudson, Integrity of International
Instruments, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 105-08 (1948); see also Korey, The Key to Human
Rights - Implementation, 570 INT'L CONCILIATION 5, 7 (1968) (referring to state-
ments of Eleanor Roosevelt often cited to the effect that the Declaration of Human
Rights did not impose legal obligations).
9 8 E.g., E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 74
(1964).
99 E.g., H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND HUMAN RIGHTS 145-52
(1950); Golsong, Implementation of International Protection of Human Rights, 110
HAGUE ACAD. RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 14 (1963).
10 0 U.N. Doc. A/492 at 69 (1946).
101 G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).
10 2 1.C.J. STAT. art. 38, para.lb; R. HIGGINS, supra note 42, at 6; H. KELSEN,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 307 (1952), where it is noted that:
[t) he frequency of conduct, the fact that certain actions or abstentions have
repeatedly been performed during a certain period of time, is only one element
of the law-creating fact called custom. The second element is the fact that the
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is how to measure these attitudes of legal obligation accurately
enough for meaningful conclusions to be drawn.
The measurement of legal obligation supporting international
laws may be obtained through attitude testing. One way to ascer-
tain attitudes is simply to ask people what they think about a sub-
ject. With public figures, it is sometimes easier to analyze what
they have already said about it. Another approach is to deduce atti-
tudes from especially signficant actions such as votes on a particular
issue. The problem, however, is that as a practical matter most dele-
gates must vote on texts of resolutions which have been prepared
by others. Thus delegate statements are probably a more sensitive
indicator of attitudes due to greater control over the particular words
used to express the delegate's position. In the case of United Na-
tions delegates, expressions of views and votes have already been
recognized as some evidence of attitudes toward legal obligation and
statements of official representatives have even been recognized as
some evidence of the growth of customary international law." 3 To
date, however, no one seems to have thoroughly studied delegate
statements as indicia of international legal obligations.0 4
No claim is made that delegate statements in the United Nations
are legally binding; though, like votes on resolutions, they may
evince recognition by a State of a particular rule of international
individuals whose conduct constitutes the custom must be convinced that they
fulfill, by their actions or abstentions, a duty, or that they exercise a right.
... They have to regard their conduct as obligatory or right. If the conduct
of the states is not accompanied by the opinion that this conduct is obligatory
or right, a so-called "usage," but not a law-creating custom, is established.
G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 15 (3d ed. 1952), adds
"[ijt is not sufficient to show that States customarily do something or refrain from
doing it. It is necessary to prove that they act in such a way because they admit a legal
obligation to do so." Jenks, The Impact of International Organizations on Public and
Private International Law, 37 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY 23, 37 (1952);
Schachter, The Relation of Law, Politics and Action in the United Nations, 109 HAGUE
ACAD. RECUBIL DES COURS 165,174 (1963).
103 Engel, 'Living' International Constitutions and the World Court (The Subse-
quent Practice of International Organs Under Their Constitutent Instruments), 16 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 865, 909-10 (1967), notes that "it is the practice of members qua mem-
bers and not the resolution of the organ qua resolution which matters." See also R.
HIGGINS, supra note 42, at 2, where she notes that "the votes and views of states have
come to have legal significance as evidence of customary law." Bleicher, The Legal
Significance of Re-Citation of General Assembly Resolutions, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 444
(1969), provides an excellent resolution voting study as an index to acceptance of cus-
tomary international law. Schachter, supra note 102, at 185, adds that "assertions of
law ... may be stated in the resolutions or they may be implied from the consensus ex-
pressed in the debates."
104 Citations to a few delegate statements were utilized, however, in M. McDOUGAL,
H. LASSWELL & 1. VLASIC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 230 (1963), to support
"recognition of inclusive competence over activities in space."
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law. °5 United Nations delegates may be thought of, in this re-
spect, as similar to those who negotiate international treaties; their
statements during negotiations may be used to resolve ambiguities
but do not otherwise bind their principals unless the statements are
specifically accepted. °6 An argument could be made that a delegate's
statement may raise an estoppel, though estoppel is not readily im-
plied in international law.0 7 Delegate statements may have some
minimal probative force per se,' °8 though most often they are con-
sidered mere rhetoric.' Perhaps what official representatives say
in a public forum should carry some weight"0 and, in fact, other
105 Bleicher, supra note 103, at 447:
[A] vote for a particular General Assembly resolution by itself creates little
more basis for a fixed expectation [for purposes of estoppel] than does a uni-
lateral declaration of intended future behavior by a representative of that state,
which in the absence of special circumstances can be altered at will .... How-
ever, if some basis is found for a reasonable expectation that a favorable Gen-
eral Assembly vote was thought by the voters to require conforming conduct,
the difficulty of attributing legal significance to the General Assembly resolu-
tion is largely overcome. If, for example, a resolution declares a rule to be
preexisting law and attributes it to a recognized source of international law, a
foundation has been established for reliance upon that resolution as a limita-
tion on the freedom of action of at least those who voted for it. A nation's
vote for such a resolution is in effect a public statement of adherence to the
legal principles embodied in the resolution.
Vitally, The Sources of International Law, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 161-62 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968), suggests that
it may be fairly asked whether the principle of good faith will permit a state
to disregard a recommendation which it has formally approved by its affirma-
tive vote. No customary rule to this effect has so far emerged .... [But dec-
larations like the Human Rights Declaration] may manifest a recognition of
certain legal principles by the member states voting for their adoption. If
adopted by a majority verging on unanimity, or virtually without opposition,
they may contribute to the formation of customary rule or evidence that it is
already formed.
106 M. WATERS, THE AD Hoc DIPLOMAT 87 (1963). "What the President ac-
cepts as his own is properly negotiated ...what he rejects is destroyed," quoting H.
WRISTON, EXECUTIVE AGENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 118 (1929).
Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-54: Gen-
eral Principles and Sources of Law, 1953 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 47, adds "[p]roposals
or concessions made in the course of negotiations do not rank as admissions."
107 Fitzmaurice, supra note 106, at 44, states that "The admission of another State's
claim or right, or the abandonment of a State's own position, will not lightly be implied."
However, "[a] statement or act may fairly be interpreted as an admission when it ap-
pears to embody or represent the bona fide belief of the party making it." Id. at 45.
108 Bowett, Estoppel Before International Tribunals and Its Relation to Acquies-
cence, 1957 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 176, 195-96.
109 Virally, supra note 105, at 140. "[S]tate representatives, under the influence of
... rhetoricism, do not always weigh their words."
110 Schachter, supra note 102, at 188, states that
Official positions of States announced in the General Assembly or Security
Council cannot be considered in legal effect as no more than judgments of pri-
vate persons. They constitute evidence of contemporaneous construction by
INTERNATIONAL LAWS AS INTEGRATORS
States do occasionally point out inconsistencies in the arguments of
their opponents."' But whatever their international standing as
such, statements are being measured here only as indices to legal obli-
gation, not as independent international acts.
It was assumed that international juridical science is a subject
matter science, so that there are no a priori limitations on research
method. Therefore, any method which aids in understanding the
international legal process should be acceptable to the international
juridical scientist. This may not be true for the international lawyer
who may be more interested in methods more useful in practice, such
as logical analysis." 2 An international lawyer may find this method
adequate in the practice of international law; but an international
juridical scientist,113 who seeks to understand international law fully,
needs to go beyond logical analysis of accepted rules to see how at-
titudes are created in support of new ones.
This task has recently become easier as more precise methods of
content analysis to measure meaning have been developed by com-
munications engineers, 114 partly in response to modern computer
capabilities. International political scientists are beginning to use
these techniques to better understand their field of international re-
lations." 5  Within the field of content analysis, specialized tech-
niques have been developed for analysis of evaluative assertions.
The pioneering explanation of these techniques describes procedures
the parties that is entitled to weight in determining the meaning and effect of
a treaty provision.
111 Zafrula Khan (Pakistan), 6 U.N. GAOR 267 (1951), charging Australia with
inconsistency with respect to the application of U. N.CHARTER, art. 2, para. 7, in human
rights questions. Allouni (Syria), 8 U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc Pol. Comm. 19, para. 56
(1953), charging South Africa with inconsistency in supporting the United Nations in-
quiry into human rights violations by Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and the U.S.S.R.
112 If States A and B agree on p, and if, on close analysis, p really includes q as part
of its meaning, then the legal science of the international lawyer properly demonstrates
that A and B are legally bound by q. A study of the human rights issue by Hersch Lauter-
pacht relies primarily on this method. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 99. He has been
highly complimented for showing that "the impact and effect of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights was stronger than many of its drafters intended." E. SCHWELB,
supra note 98, at 75.
113 Conceptually, the international lawyer as practitioner and the international ju-
ridical scientist as legal scholar are related to each other in the subfield of international
law, in somewhat the same way as the diplomat as practitioner and the international
political scientist as scholar are related to each other in the total field of international
relations. Of course in the work of any one person there may be considerable over-
lapping of approaches and fields.
114 For an introduction see P. STONE, D. DEMPHY, M. SMITH, & D. OGILVIE, ET
AL., THE GENERAL INQUIRER (1966).
11 5 See R. NORTH, 0. HOLSTI, M. ZANINOVICH, & D. ZINNES, CONTENT ANALY-
sIs (1963); Holsti, External Conflict and Internal Consensus: The Sino-Soviet Case, in
P. STONE, ET AL., supra note 114, at 343, with extensive bibliography at 356-58.
1971]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
for extracting from a message the evaluations being made of signifi-
cant concepts and assigning numbers representing the direction and
intensity of these evaluations." 6 Fortunately a rule of parsimony is
applicable here:
As in other scientific investigations, content analysis should be
done not as precisely as possible but rather as imprecisely as pos-
sible - that is, as roughly as the circumstances of the study will
allow (in order to minimize costs relative to returns) .... If the
study does not deal with a large and representative body of ma-
terial to be analyzed in terms of a set of highly specifiable cate-
gories which appear with substantial frequencies in order to pro-
duce objective and precise results - if these conditions are not
met, careful counting is probably not warranted."'7
Where analysis is conducted by a research team working under a
project director, masking techniques are necessary and appropriate
dictionaries must be developed to assure uniformity of analysis." 8
However, when a single analyst is used, as here, these precautions
are not so necessary.
Without content analysis techniques of some sort, it is hard to
achieve scientific precision when dealing with a very broad concept.
Hence, as a topic attains unmanageable proportions, there is a ten-
dency to subdivide it, by definition, into compartments. However,
evaluative assertion analysis is more useful than excessive specifica-
tion in measuring acceptance of international human rights laws in
the United Nations South African Indian debates.
Most public statements of acceptance or rejection of human
rights standards in these debates were phrased in rather general
terms. Statements that could be categorized by specific fact situations
usually related to what other States, especially South Africa, should
do. Nevertheless, analysis of the intensity of the general statements
may disclose something about acceptance or rejection of human
rights standards. In the instant study the specific fact category of
the treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa remained
constant. Therefore, the effect, if any, of this specific fact situation
116 Osgood, Saporta & Nunnally, Evaluative Assertion Analysis, 3 LITERA 47-102
(1956). See also Holsti (major author), Evaluative Assertion Analysis, in R. NORTH,
ET AL., supra note 114, at 91 et seq. Perhaps these techniques are not adequate for liter-
ary criticism of poetic messages in contrast to ordinary prose assertions. See Lewis,
Universal Functional Requisites of Society: The Unending Quest, 3 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 3, 16-18 (1970).
117B. BERELSON, CONTENT ANALYSIS IN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 132
(1952).
118These have been described by Osgood, Saporta & Nunnally and Holsti, supra
note 116.
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should not explain any variations in intensity of the general state-
ments being measured.11
Each statement was weighted according to the single factor of
the "Human Rights Acceptance" scaled as shown in Table 1. This
was constructed upon a consideration of factors and gradations of hu-
man rights acceptance. As is customary in attitude scaling, 20 the scale
was constructed with seven categories around a zero median. This
provides a convenient high-medium-low breakdown of acceptance, as
well as rejection, and a neutral median. Eight guides to acceptance
or rejection were used. These were specificity, the form of the state-
ment, the scope of the rights accepted, the strength of the statement
of a general rule, the relation of the statement to the speaker's State,
identification of the source of the norm, reference to the United Na-
tions General Assembly powers, and the "common law evidence
analogy" explained below. At first glance, this appears to be a
fairly large number of guides to use, and no doubt some of them
could be resolved into others on further analysis. However, usually
only a few of the guides applied to a given statement so it was help-
ful to have all of them available in specific terms. In fact, actual
scaling according to these factors was not especially difficult.
The scale is constructed so that the eight factors are equally im-
portant in judging human rights acceptance. However, some judg-
ment had to be used in assigning particular intensity weights within
each factor. Some factors indicated the degree of acceptance but
were ambiguous as to the degree of rejection, while others did not
differentiate between two degrees of acceptance or rejection. In
these respects, the scale is not neatly logical. As has been observed,
intensity of evaluation "is largely a semantic problem and there are
few linguistic guides.' 121  Reading all the material to be scaled be-
119 But see Schachter, supra note 102, at 179, to the effect general statements only
appear so, and in fact are related to the specific context in which they are made. It
should be possible to test this contention using the methods of this study. The other
non-apartheid human rights contexts are "ndicated in Table 2. Statements of acceptance
or rejection of human rights norms in these other contexts could be scaled on the Human
Rights Acceptance Scale in Table 1, and these could be plotted on Figures 1, 2, & 3.
Statistical measures of consistency could then be applied, and this should show the de-
gree to which the context affects the statements of acceptance or rejection. These oper-
ations have not been performed, so the question remains an open one. If context is an
important factor, then the conclusions of this study are limited more specifically to hu-
man rights laws involved in the treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa. If
context is not a very important factor, the conclusions of this study relate to human
rights laws in general. But at least the variations in the findings reported here may not
be explained by the specific issue being discussed, as this study has been planned so that
the context remains constant.
120 Osgood, et al., supra note 116, at 86.
121 Id.
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forehand was helpful in constructing the scale; 22 nevertheless, some
scale adjustments had to be made in the course of rereading for
scaling.
Each scale factor, itself, follows from certain assumptions. A
specific statement is presumed to be stronger than the denial of its
opposite. Acceptance of a greater number of specific human rights
is presumed stronger than acceptance of only a few. This is aside
from the degree to which the statement is specific or the strength
of the terms in which it is made. Whenever a delegate speaks, he
speaks for his State to some extent; but if he makes this explicit, it
is stronger evidence of acceptance or rejection by his State, and this
is what is being measured. Sometimes the delegate makes specific
reference to the source of the norms he is accepting and this also in-
dicates a higher degree of acceptance. Finally, a claim of more ex-
tensive powers of the General Assembly to deal with a violation is
presumed to indicate a greater acceptance of the obligation. No
doubt different observers would differ somewhat on the specific in-
tensities assigned to these factors, though most would probably agree
on the general principles on which they are based.
Common law lawyers may find an analogy from the law of evi-
dence useful in understanding construction of the scale. Let us as-
sume that a human rights case were being litigated against a
particular State in some appropriate tribunal. Assume further that a
statement had previously been made in the United Nations and the
State making it was charged with violating the very human rights
standards covered by the statement or subsumed under it. The op-
posing lawyer would want to find admissions by the delegate of
that State that these human rights norms are binding obligations.
Of course, if a delegate had said these human rights norms are not
binding obligations, then such a statement is a self-serving declara-
tion and of no particular importance for this case. This distinction
may not actually govern the admission of evidence as a matter of
international law, but common law lawyers are used to working with
it in preparing municipal cases for trial so it may provide an overall
rule of thumb for scaling purposes. In simple terms: Would the
opposing lawyer reading the statement think he had really found
something useful? Or would he find it useless for trial because a
self-serving statement? If an admission, the question is how damag-
ing is it? If self-serving, how self-serving?
122 This may have introduced some unconscious bias, but it was not possible to pre-
dict the outcome until the graphs in Figures 1 through 3 were actually drawn.
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Of course, the object of scaling is not primarily to ascertain the
attitudes of delegates as individuals, but as representative of atti-
tudes in the States for which they speak. There should be some
connection since the statements were made officially on behalf of
these States in an international arena. However, United Nations
delegates are undoubtedly more prone than other public officials to
justify real or hypothetical state action in terms of international
standards of conduct. So their attitudes may not even be typical of
diplomats as a whole, much less of significant policy-making groups
within the State. Nevertheless, it seemed most fruitful to begin
with an analysis of United Nations delegate statements and reserve
for others the investigation of correlations with attitudes of other
significant groups at home.1 3
The actual statements of acceptance or rejection of human rights
standards were collected by examining the official records for the
first 16 General Assembly sessions of debates on the status of Indians
in the Union of South Africa. 24 In each session there was a lengthy
discussion by 'Indian and South African delegates. South African
delegates uniformly objected to any United Nations intervention
and relied on many arguments to support this position. Conse-
quently, South Africa was uniformly scaled as minus three (max-
imum rejection) on the Human Rights Acceptance Scale. Indian
delegates argued for removal of the restrictions on Indians in South
Africa, but scrupulously avoided statements concerning what stance
the United Nations could take in India if an appropriate case arose
there. Since a statement by a delegate on what could be done at
home was taken to be a better indication of true acceptance or rejec-
tion than a statement on what should be done by some other govern-
ment, India was uniformly scored as zero (neutral) on the Human
Rights Acceptance Scale. 125  One special aspect of the treatment of
123 For other types of studies that have been done (1) of diplomats and foreign
office legal advisers, see notes 61-66, supra; (2) of newspaper editors, Namenwirth, Zvi
& Brewer, Elite Editorial Comment on the European and Atlantic Communities in
Four Countries, in P. STONE, ET AL., supra note 114, at 401-27; and (3) of elite public
opinion, W. BUCHANAN, & H. CANTRIL, How NATIONS SEE EACH OTHER (1953);
K. DEUTSCH, L. EDINGER, R. MACRIDIS, & R. MERRITT, FRANCE, GERMANY AND THE
WESTERN ALLIANCE (1967).
124 Discussions are reported verbatim only for plenary sessions, the other discussions
being recorded in fairly full paraphrase. It seemed easier to detect attitude variations
in verbatim text than in paraphrase, but on the other hand, it took longer to locate
pertinent material in examining verbatim text. Beginning with session V, there is an
index to the official records which makes it easier to locate pertinent discussions. For
the first three sessions agenda items had to be used, and this is somewhat less reliable.
125 The statements of the South African and Indian delegates were not examined in
detail, since they were volminous and somewhat repetitious. Also it appeared that
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Indians in the Union of South Africa required special attention.
India's argument was based, in part, on the enforcement of the spe-
cial treaties signed by South Africa in 1927 and 1932, as well as the
particular arrangements under which Indians emigrated to the Union
in the late 1800's. Some discussions urged United Nations inter-
vention on this ground, and of course these were omitted from con-
sideration.
Beginning with session XVII, discussion of the treatment of In-
dians in the Union of South Africa merged with discussion of apart-
heid in general. Since this was a change in context, statements for
session XVII and after were not examined. Also, most discussions
of the Indian issue took place in the General Assembly or its Com-
mittees, so the investigation was not extended to Security Council
records or International Court of Justice proceedings.
After each statement was read and collected, the analysis was
begun by making a list of United Nations members for each General
Assembly session from I through XVI (except session IV). Of
course, the number of States in the United Nations increased stead-
ily over this period. The membership list for each session was then
rearranged into six regional groupings: Western Europe and Dis-
persion;' 26 Latin America;'7 Communist Bloc;128 Near East and
Northern Africa;' Southern Africa (except the Union of South Af-
rica);13° and Far East.' This division was based on a general
the scale values assigned as indicated in the text would not be affected by a full examina-
tion. Indian delegates generally stated their positions more calmly and South African
delegates generally did so more positively, though this difference is not reflected in the
scale values assigned to these two States.
126 Western Europe and Dispersion included: Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada;
Denmark; Finland; France; Greece; Iceland; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Luxembourg; Nether-
lands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; Union of South Africa; Spain; Sweden; United
Kingdom; and United States. "Dispersion" obviously is analogous to the Diaspora and
refers to Western European peoples living outside Western Europe in States predomi-
nantly Western European in culture.
127 Latin America included: Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica;
Cuba (through 1958); Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; Guatemala; Haiti;
Honduras; Mexico; Nicaragua; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Uraguay; and Venezuela.
128 The Communist Bloc included: Albania; Bulgaria; Byelorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic; Cuba (from 1959 on); Czechoslovakia; Hungary; Mongolia; Poland; Ro-
mania; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; and
Yugoslavia. "Bloc" with respect to these States is used for brevity and does not neces-
sarily connote any monolithic implications.
129 Near East and Northern Africa included: Algeria; Cyprus; Egypt (through 1957);
Iran; Iraq; Jordan; Lebanon; Libya; Mauritania; Morocco; Saudi Arabia; Sudan; Syria
(except 1958 through 1961); Tunisia; Turkey; United Arab Republic; and Yemen.
130 Southern Africa (except the Union of South Africa) included: Cameroon;
Central Africa Republic; Chad; Congo (Brazzaville); Congo (Democratic Republic);
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knowledge of ethnic groupings and a full scholarly reconsideration
of this division might lead to some changes, especially in borderline
areas.' With the People's Republic of China outside the United
Nations, the total population of each of the regions was fairly equal.
The purpose of the regional division was to determine whether re-
gional patterns differed from those of the United Nations as a whole.
As it turned out, the data were insufficient to justify charting regional
results for the last three regions. Further, the patterns in the first
three regions, shown in Figures 2 and 3, were similar to those
for the United Nations as a whole. However, there is a significant
difference in the general levels of acceptance among the three re-
gions charted. In particular, the Communist Bloc delegates ex-
pressed acceptance of human rights norms to a considerably greater
degree than those of Western Europe and its dispersion, so the re-
gional divisions did prove worthwhile.
After the membership lists were completed by regions, the atti-
tude expressed in each statement was scaled by reference to the Hu-
man Rights Acceptance Scale in Table 1 and the result entered in
the appropriate region for the appropriate General Assembly session.
Most often there was only one delegate attutide scaled in a given ses-
sion for a given member, so that the scaled attitude for that state-
ment was also the "Average Attitude" of the member State for that
session. Occasionally, however, two statements were made by a dele-
gate in a particular session, and if their intensity differed, the two at-
titudes were averaged for that session. The average national atti-
tudes were then totalled by regions, to give a "Region Algebraic
Sum." When this was divided by the number of States expressing
an attitude in the region, the result was the "Region Average Stated
National Attitude." When the Region Algebraic Sum was divided
by the total States in the region, the result was the "Region Average
Attitude for All Members." As expected, the Region Average Atti-
tude for All Members was closer to zero than the Region Average
Stated National Attitude because the silent members were always
scaled zero for that session. After the six Region Algebraic Sums
were computed, they were combined for the United Nations as a
whole, to give the "United Nations Algebraic Sum." This was
Dahomey; Ethiopia; Gabon; Ghana; Guinea; Ivory Coast; Liberia; Madagascar; Mali;
Niger; Nigeria; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Somalia; Togo; and Upper Volta.
131 Far East included: Afghanistan; Burma; Cambodia; Ceylon; China (Taiwan);
India; Indonesia; Japan; Laos; Malaysia; Nepal; Pakistan; Philippines; and Thailand.
132 See Russett, Delineating International Regions, in QUANTITATIVE INTERNA-
TIONAL POLITICS 317 (J. Singer ed. 1968).
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divided by the total States expressing an attitude in that session, to
give the "United Nations Average Stated National Attitude."
Again, this was divided by the total United Nations membership to
give the "United Nations Average Attitude for All Members."
Since no attempt was made to weigh attitudes by population, the
results should be thought of in terms of numbers of States. Hence,
the attitude of a small State is given equal weight with that of a
large one. Also, it is important to notice that the final figures are
independent of the number of statements made in a particular ses-
sion. In this respect, the average attitude is like a percentage figure.
The comparison is being made with other statements for that session,
but the resulting averages may be compared from session to session.
The next step, therefore, was to plot the average attitudes for all the
sessions to enable this comparison. Figure 1 does this for the en-
tire United Nations and Figures 2 and 3 do this for Western Europe
and Dispersion, Latin America, and the Communist Bloc, respec-
tively. In each figure, the solid line represents the average stated
national attitude, while the dashed line represents the average atti-
tude for all members.
As it turned out, the final graphs showed a remarkable pattern.
Allowing for the roughness of the data, relatively level acceptance
prevailed during the first five General Assembly sessions but during
sessions VI, VII, and VIII there is a noticeable decline. After this,
however, acceptance rises again to approximately its former level and
stays there to session XIII. The three regional charts show more
individual variation as would be expected from the smaller samples
involved. Such pattern as there is, however, agrees with that of the
United Nations as a whole, so that sessions VI, VII, and VIII show
a serious interference with the generally stable acceptance level.
Frequency of expressions in absolute terms and in percentages were
computed and charted but failed to explain the patterns in the accept-
ance graphs. Moreover, frequency figures seemed to show little pat-
tern at all, except for a decline in the sessions after XII. The differ-
ence between session dates and even spaces of time likewise appears
irrelevant for all practical purposes. It will be remembered that the
graphs were constructed by General Assembly sessions, and not by
years. Sessions occurred approximately once a year, but not exactly,
and of course the human rights question was not debated at the same
time in each session. It appears that revising the graphs with time
as the abscissa, rather than sessions, would change the results only
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slightly. The major movement in sessions VI through VIII would
still require explanation.
Many possible explanations might be proposed, based on correla-
tion with other events taking place during this period. 3 ' However,
one possible explanation occurred as a result of the preparation for
this study. The original plan was to extend the analysis to all dis-
cussions in General Assembly human rights "cases ' 184 to date. In
preparation for this, a preliminary list of such cases was made, which
is included as Table 2, omitting those concerning the Union of
South Africa. The case of discrimination in Central Europe was so
briefly considered that it can just barely be called a "case." Also,
it is very risky to generalize from only seven instances. However, the
timing of the cases in Table 2 shows that session VI was a remark-
able year for United Nations human rights cases. It is equally re-
markable that none have occurred since, with the exception of those
involving South Africa. The data suggest a connection between
Table 2 and Figure 1. It appears that human rights acceptance
was initially rather high, but by session VI it became obvious that
these norms could interfere with national sovereignty. They were
starting to be used against specific governments on matters of fairly
general application, and delegates may have become somewhat un-
comfortable. They apparently became more cautious about making
admissions that could be used against their States. This seems to have
persisted through about session VIII, but by then the approach to
implementing human rights had apparently changed. There were no
more cases based on the existing Charter and resolutions except for
South Africa, a special, exceptional case. Apparently the new ap-
proach was to seek further specific international agreement and it
then became safe publicly to accept international human rights norms
again. Stated bluntly, human rights norms were acceptable until it
appeared that they would be used, but then they conflicted too much
with State interests. Those directing the program apparently sensed
this, and hence turned to slightly different tactics.
133 An interesting comparison may be made with the graph Disappointment and
Hopes in the Relations Between East and West in The Observer (London), Aug. 4,
1963, reprinted in P. HEVEsY, THE UNIFICATION OF THE WORLD 346 (1966). This
was an attempt at a rough representation of international events from 1948 through
1963. There does not seem to be much correlation between the events represented
and those studied here.
134 The word "case" is used here in the same sense as in L. SOHN, CASES AND
OTHER MATERIALS ON WORLD LAW (1950), and L. SOHN, CASES ON UNITED NA-
TIONS LAW (2d ed. 1967). Consideration of a reasonably unified problem with rea-
sonably significant international legal aspects by United Nations organs is regarded as
a "case." A reasonably definite outcome is regarded as a "decision."
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If this tentative explanation is valid and can bear further analy-
sis, it tends to validate the method used to reach it, just as the method
tends to validate the explanation. These conclusions may already be
known to an "insider" who has followed the human rights program
over the years, so that for him this study would merely explicate
the obvious. Their significance then would be that they were reached
by an "outsider" working from published records without the bene-
fit of inside information from those who have lived through these
developments. If the correlation suggested here is valid, it appears
also that the measuring method is sensitive enough to show it. This is
likewise significant, for it induces confidence in results that are not
so obvious but, rather, deduced from other uses of similar methods.
The conclusions here may be compared with those of a normal non-
quantitative study, such as the following:
Nearly all governments were at that time [19471 convinced of
the need to provide for the international protection of fundamental
human rights .... Since then, however, the situation has changed
and in 1963 most of our governments are less willing to submit
to international control.185
If the few statements for the later sessions are representative, the
graph in Figure 1 also bears out this observation, as far as it goes.
But what of possible variations between 1946 and 1963? Is the
method of expert opinion, unaided by scientific measurement, likely
to be precise enough to uncover this? And how convincing is such
a conclusion, when often one expert's pronouncement seems to be
balanced by another's? More precise methods offer a little more
chance of agreement among experts.
Finally, these findings help to identify the type of process by
which human rights laws tend to integrate. If human rights laws
were self-fulfilling prophecies, general acceptance should have risen
gradually as the campaign mounted against the Union of South
Africa. This did not happen and instead the pattern looks more
like what would occur if human rights laws struck some funda-
mental chord of justice and gained immediate acceptance, at least
for the period following World War II.186 The deviation from this
pattern appears to represent the counter-force of national self-
interest coming into play when it appeared that human rights laws
were actually starting to be applied broadly.
185 Golsong, supra note 99, at 140.
136 It may be that a study over a longer time span would show the type of accep-
tance pattern expected of a self-fulfilling prophecy. See the historical treatment by E.
SCHWELB, supra note 98.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing should give the international juridical scientist
cause for guarded optimism. Obviously many more factors than in-
ternational laws must be investigated before the processes for build-
ing an integrated international community are fully understood.
Hence even the limited conclusions reached here must be regarded
as tentative. Nevertheless theory-building may produce proposi-
tions capable of empirical testing even in this difficult field. The-
oretical inquiry into how international laws may operate directly
helps to isolate the effects of international laws which follow funda
mental rules already generally accepted as fair, weaving them into
municipal rules to achieve the greatest spillover effect on municipal
government officials, and their operation as self-fulfilling prophecies.
In addition, indirect effects of international laws, such as those estab-
lishing international institutions, may be separated in theory for
analysis. Once these mechanisms are isolated by theoretical inquiry,
empirical research may be brought to bear on each. Some conclu-
sions may be drawn from the studies of International Court of Jus-
tice national judges and United Nations delegates speaking on the
human rights issue in South Africa concerning the effects of inter-
national laws considered fundamentally fair from their inception.
It was possible to study the spillover effect with respect to several
decisions and international crises. Increasing personal contacts un-
der the aegis of an international institution was observed. As em-
pirical testing increases in this field the results should be more con-
clusive and of more general significance. Furthermore, those under-
taken at least illustrate some types of work that can be done.
Those promoting international laws as steps toward a fully de-
veloped international legal system may also gain some hope from the
works reviewed here. To some extent the national judges on the
International Court of Justice do seem to be adopting an interna-
tional viewpoint in response to international laws, occasionally even
against the interests of their own States. Similarly United Nations
delegates through most of the debates on the status of Indians in the
Union of South Africa were often willing to admit that international
human rights standards applied to their own States, despite the con-
troversy concerning the status of international human rights stand-
ards as international laws. In at least one significant decision, one
set of municipal government officials felt significantly obligated to
follow international laws, and in several international crises it was
concluded that international law works. Finally at least one inter-
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national institution established by international laws increased per-
sonal contacts and aided international integration in this way.
With further theory-building and empirical testing, perhaps the
role of international laws in building an integrated international
legal system may be more fully understood." 7  In time perhaps this
knowledge may be utilized to strengthen the international legal sys-
tem and advance toward a more integrated world community.
137 The writer expects to carry this inquiry forward in a sequel which will set forth
a theory of international economic community law and measure the use of international
economic laws to build a world economic community in which developed States accept
an obligation to aid lesser-developed ones.
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Figure 1. United Nations average stated national attitude and average attitude, all members
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Figure 2. Western Europe & Dispersion, and Latin America average stated national attitudes
3 and average attitudes, all members
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Figure 3. Communist Bloc average stated national attitude and average attitude, all members
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